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The Appellee, Sandra Moore, pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits this Reply Brief.
JURISDICTION
This Court has original jurisdiction to decide this appeal
pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2) (i) .
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was the trial court's finding that the Decree of Divorce

provided for a minimum subsistence level of $1,500 per month which
amount was to continue for three years regardless of remarriage or
emancipation clearly erroneous?
2.

Did the trial Court err as a matter of law in denying

David Moore's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and by concluding
that David Moore was solely responsible to provide medical coverage
for the children?
3.

Did the trial Court err as a matter of law in concluding

that gifts of cash, clothing and cars made directly to the children
are not considered child support?
4.

Did the trial Court err as a matter of law in concluding

that David Moore failed to establish a substantial and material
change in circumstances which permitted the reduction of his child
support obligation after the entry of the decree of divorce?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court's findings of fact may be set aside if found
to be clearly erroneous.
Ct. App. 1989).

Mauahan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah

The trial court's legal conclusions will be given
5

no deference and will be reviewed for legal correctness.

General

Glass Corp. v. Mast Construction Co., 754 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct. App.
1988.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The following statutory provisions are determinative of the
issues on appeal:
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(5)
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.10
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.1
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

The Nature of the Case

This is a divorce proceeding, specifically dealing with the
child support issues. This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered after a bench trial held on
October 27, 1993.
District

Court,

The judgment was entered in the Fourth Judicial
Utah

County,

the

Honorable

Ray

M.

Harding

presiding.
B.

Course of Proceedings

The Plaintiff filed his Complaint for Divorce in 1986. (R.3)
The Decree of Divorce was entered on August 25, 1987.

(R. 58) . On

February 27, 1987, Sandra Moore filed a verified Petition for Order
to Show Cause re:

Contempt and Child Support Arrearage.

(R. 68).

David Moore filed a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce (R. 95)
and Amended Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce (R. 99).
Trial on the Order to Show Cause and Petition to Modify was
6
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that Plaintiff is going to accept a job which will initially pay
approximately $2,000.00 per month.
exchange

financial

information

The parties are ordered to

and

disclose

their

respective

financial statements each year and renegotiate the level of support
and maintenance between them once each year for three (3) years at
which time a permanent

level of support shall be fixed.

For

purposes of this Decree of Divorce, it is hereby ordered that the
minimum level of $1,500.00 shall not be reduced or modified before
June 1, 1988."
4.

(R. 56-57).

At the trial, Judge Harding specifically found that under

the Decree, alimony was $3 00.00 per month and child support was
$200.00 per month per child.
5.
offset

(R. 403-405, 415-420).

Judge Harding ordered any child support arrearages to be
by

support.
6.

any

amounts

previously

paid

for

alimony

and

child

(R. 403-405, 415-420).
At the time the Decree of Divorce was entered, David

Moore was earning $2,000.00 per month but it was anticipated that
David Moore's earnings would increase in the future.

(R. 471, 630,

54-58) .
7.

The Decree stated that the $1,500.00 per month would not

be modified before June 1, 1988.
8.

David

Moore

(R. 54-58).

filed his Petition

Divorce on or about August 26, 1989.

to Modify

Decree

of

(R. 95).

9.

In July of 1988, Sandra Moore remarried.

10.

In August, 1988, Jenessa Moore turned 18 and in April,

1990, Holly Moore turned 18.

(R. 47-53).
8

(R. 636).

11.

In March, 1993, Matt Moore turned 18.

(R. 47-53).

15.

David Moore paid Sandra Moore $1,500.00 per month in

combined child support and alimony from July 1987 through July
1988.
16.

In August, 1988, David Moore unilaterally began paying

Sandra Moore $1,000.00 in child support, terminating his $300.00
per month alimony and reducing the child support by $200.00 based
on Janessa turning 18 in August, 1988.
17.

(R. 463, 425-420).

From August 1988 through April 1990, when Holly Moore

turned 18, David Moore paid child support in the amount of $16,214
in child

support to Sandra Moore.

(Plaintiff

Exhibit

10 and

Defendant Exhibit 26).
18.

From June 1989 through December 1989, Holly Moore lived

with David Moore in Sandy, Utah.

For that seven month period of

time, David Moore unilaterally reduced his child support payments
to Sandra Moore by $200.00 representing support to Holly during
those months.

(Plaintiff Exhibit 10, Defendant Exhibit 26, R. 415-

420) .
19.

From April 1990 through March 1991, David Moore paid

Sandra Moore $9,100.00 in child support.

(Plaintiff Exhibit 10,

Defendant Exhibit 26, R. 415-420).
20.

Sandra Moore testified that from April 1991 through the

time of trial David Moore failed to pay any child support.

(R.

668) .
21.

David Moore did pay Sandra Moore the sum of $3,000.00 in

December 1992 or January 1993 and an additional $2,900.00 in April
9

199 3 with instruction to Sandra Moore that such funds were being
paid as child support but were intended to pay for the then adult
children's missions.

David Moore sent letters to his children

explaining the foregoing.

(Plaintiff Exhibit 10, Defendant Exhibit

25, R. 384, R. 415-420, 575-581).
22.

In June 1993, David Moore unilaterally attempted to pay

Sandra Moore child support by delivering a 1983 Chevy Citation to
Sandra

Moore.

Sandra Moore

did

not

ask

for

the

vehicle

or

communicate to David Moore her acceptance of the vehicle as child
support.

At the time of trial, the vehicle was not titled in

Sandra Moore's name nor did Sandra Moore have any claim or interest
in the vehicle.
23.

(R. 403-405, 657-659).

Sandra Moore testified that following the entry of the

Decree of Divorce, David Moore would unilaterally make deductions
from his child support obligation without forewarning or consulting
Sandra

Moore

and

she

was

expected

to

accept

his

generosity

regardless of its compliance with the orders of the Court.

(R.

656) .
24.

In September, 1991, David Moore, who was ordered

to

maintain medical insurance for the benefit of the minor children,
commenced making COBRA payments first in the amount of $625.00 per
then and in April, 1992 to $722.00.

At the same time, Moore

unilaterally discontinued his child support payments to Sandra
Moore.

(R. 495-498).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial Court correctly ruled that the $1,500.00 per month
10

subsistence payment was to continue for a minimum of three years
after

the decree

of divorce.

The evidence

before

the

Court

established that David Moore had a history of substantial earnings
prior to the entry of the decree of divorce.

The Court concluded

based on the evidence before it that the intentions of the parties
were that this level of support was bare subsistence for Sandra
Moore and that the parties entered into the agreement based on the
belief that David Moore would soon gain new employment which was
comparable to his historical earnings.

The Court's ruling was

within the broad discretion of its equitable powers in fashioning
a remedy in the context of divorce action.
was

not

improperly

assessed

any monies

As such, David Moore
for

alimony

or

child

support.
The trial court correctly required David Moore to accept total
responsibility

for providing health insurance coverage for the

minor children from July 1987 through October 1993.
believes

that the terms of the decree

of divorce

respective rights and obligations of the parties.

Sandra Moore
govern

the

Pursuant to the

terms of the decree, David Moore was responsible for the payment of
the health insurance coverage for the minor children.

Sandra Moore

argues that prior to an order issuing modifying the terms of the
decree of divorce, those terms govern.

Because David Moore is

required maintain the medical insurance for the benefit of the
minor children, the trial court correctly ruled that he was not
entitled to any credit for the premiums paid.
The trial court correctly ruled that David Moore failed to
11

establish

a

substantial

and

material

change

in

circumstances

warranting a modification of the child support as set forth in the
decree of divorce.

Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing

to adopt the proposed findings submitted by David Moore.

ARGUMENT
Point I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE $1,500.00 PAYMENTS
MADE BY DAVID MOORE WERE TO CONTINUE FOR THREE YEARS
REGARDLESS OF ANY CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES.
Prior to the entry of the decree, the parties negotiated a
settlement.

The parties agreed that the minimum amount which

Sandra Moore needed as subsistence was $1,500.00 per month.

Sandra

Moore testified that while there was discussion concerning what
portion of the monies were to be designated as alimony or child
support, the parties never reached an agreement as to any such
formula.

(R.

632).

David Moore does not assign as error the

Court's finding of fact that said subsistence payment in fact
consisted of $3 00.00 per month alimony and $2 00.00 per month per
child for child support.

Rather, David Moore assigns as error the

Court's conclusion of law that said subsistence payments were to
continue without modification for a period of three years from the
entry

of

the

decree.

Sandra

Moore

believes

that

the

Court

correctly ruled and requests this Court affirm on this issue.
The Moore's were divorced by decree of the Court on or about
12

August 25, 1987.

The decree was based on the negotiations of the

parties and a stipulation entered into and signed by the parties.
David Moore correctly argues that the Court admitted extrinsic
evidence to ascertain and explain the parties intents concerning
the disputed paragraph of the decree.

The paragraph of the decree

in dispute reads
Plaintiff is ordered to pay $1,500.00 per month to Defendant,
in cash each month, for alimony and child support.
This
amount is regarded as minimum subsistence level for Defendant
and her six children notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff
is going to accept a job which will initially pay
approximately $2,000.00 per month. The parties are ordered to
exchange financial information and disclose their respective
financial statements each year and renegotiate the level of
support and maintenance between them once ear year for three
(3) years at which time a permanent level of support shall be
fixed. For purposes of this Decree of Divorce, it is hereby
ordered that the minimum level of $1,500.00 shall not be
reduced or modified before June 1, 1988." (R. 56-57).
Having heard all testimony regarding the negotiations of the
stipulation and regarding the payments, Judge Harding correctly
ruled "the stipulation entered into by the parties, and the decree,
provide a minimum subsistence level for the Defendant and her six
children of $1500 per month."
considering

all

of

the

(R. 405). Further, after carefully

testimony

of

the witnesses

and

their

respective demeanors, the Court concluded that the parties intended
that the payments would continue for three years regardless of
remarriage of Sandra Moore or emancipation of any of the minor
children.
The

trial

court

conclusion

that

the

minimum

subsistence

payment was intended to continue for three years is a correct
conclusion

of

law.

Utah

Code
13

Annotated,

Section

30-3-3(5)

provides:
Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise,
any order of the Court that a party Pay alimony to a former
spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of the
former spouse.
In the present
otherwise.

case, the decree of divorce does

specify

Specifically, the Decree of Divorce contemplates that

no permanent award of alimony or child support shall be fixed for
three

years

testimony

after

of

the

Sandra

entry

Moore

of the decree
makes

it

clear

of

divorce.

that

it

The

was

her

expectation that Mr. Moore would obtain employment comparable to
his historical earnings.

Based thereon, it was her belief that

when the permanent support levels were in fact set, they would be
going up.
The

trial

court

correctly

heard

extrinsic

evidence

and

properly concluded that it was the intent of the parties that such
subsistence level payments would continue for a period of three
years.

This conclusion is bolstered by the plain language of the

decree which states "Plaintiff is ordered to pay $1,500.00 per
month to Defendant, in cash each month, for alimony and child
support.

This amount is regarded as minimum subsistence level for

Defendant

and

her

Plaintiff

is going

six

children

to accept

notwithstanding

a job which will

the

fact

that

initially

pay

approximately $2,000.00 per month."
The plain language of the decree speaks for itself.

David

Moore stipulated that the minimum subsistence level for his wife
and six children was $1,500.00.

He did so knowing that he was

taking a job which paid only $2,000.00 per month as gross monthly
14

income.

David Moore clearly entered into this agreement because he

believed that he was capable of earning more than his then present
income and that he could support the obligations contained in the
stipulated decree of divorce.
Further, David Moore knew that the permanent level of support
would not be established until three years from the date of the
entry of the decree.

Mr. Moore presented no testimony before the

Court that he believed that this provision was included in order
that

his

permanent

subsistence level.

support

might

be

lower

than

the

minimum

In contrast, Sandra Moore did testify that she

believed the purpose of this provision was for an increased amount
of support.

(R.

632-633).

Sandra Moore urges this Court to affirm the trial court's
conclusion of law that the parties intended that the subsistence
level payments continue until such time as permanently established
pursuant to the terms of the decree.
Point II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT DAVID MOORE SHOULD BE
SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONTINUED MAINTENANCE OF HEALTH
INSURANCE FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE MINOR CHILDREN TOGETHER WITH
THE PAYMENT OF UNINSURED MEDICAL EXPENSES.
The trial court correctly ruled that David Moore be required
to continue to maintain medical insurance coverage for the benefit
of the minor children.

As such, this Court should affirm the

decision of the trial court.
As noted above, the parties were divorced based on a decree
entered following the parties entering into a stipulation.
38, 405). Pursuant to the Stipulation, paragraph 9, it states
15

(R.

That in addition to payment of child support and spousal
support the minor children and Defendant are in need of
medical insurance coverage. Plaintiff agrees to furnish and
pay for medical insurance coverage and to pay 100% of all
deductible charges and non-covered expenses for medical
treatment for the minor children and to the extent possible to
maintain the same group coverage on the Defendant with her
paying the costs of said coverage.
(R. 3 5-3 6 ) .

This paragraph was incorporated into the Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce verbatim.
(R. 47-51, 58).
On or about April 4, 1989, Sandra Moore filed a Verified
Petition for Order to Show Cause in re: Contempt and Child Support
Arrearages.

(R. 68)

Specifically, this action was filed to

enforce the terms of the Decree of Divorce.

In response to this

Order to Show Cause, David Moore filed a Petition to Modify the
Decree.

(R. 95).

In the Petition to Modify the Decree, David Moore specifically
requests

that

the

Plaintiff

be

ordered

to

maintain

medical

insurance for the minor children and that the party who has custody
of the children be ordered to be liable for all noncovered medical
expenses incurred for the minor children.

(R. 92-95).

Thus, at

least with respect to the liability for the payment of the medical
insurance of the minor children, the Plaintiff David Moore did not
seek a modification of the terms of the decree of divorce.

Thus,

the trial court correctly ruled that he be required to continue to
maintain

the

medical

insurance

for

the

benefit

of

the

minor

children.
David Moore filed a Motion to Amend or Alter the Judgment.
(R.

421-422).

In this Motion, David Moore sought for the first
16

time to modify the allocation of the cost of the payment of the
premium for the medical insurance. Judge Harding denied the Motion
based on his earlier decision on the issue of medical insurance.
(R. 443-444).
David Moore cites to various sections of the Utah Code in
support of his argument that Sandra Moore should be required to pay
one half of both the medical insurance premium and one half of the
uninsured medical expenses. However, the laws referred to by David
Moore were not enacted until after the trial in this matter.

The

laws in existence at the time of the trial on this matter are
stated as follows:
Section 78-45-7.1, Utah Code Annotated.
When no prior court order exists or the prior court order
makes no specific provision for the payment of medical and
dental expenses for dependent children, the Court in its
order:
(1) shall include a provision assigning responsibility
for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and
dental expenses for the dependent children; and
(2) may include a provision requiring the purchase and
maintenance of appropriate health, hospital and dental
care for those children if insurance coverage is
or
becomes available at a reasonable cost.
Section 78-45-7.15/ Utah Code Annotated.
(1) Only the costs of health and dental insurance premiums
for children are included in the base combined child support
obligation table.
(2) Uninsured medical and dental expenses are not included in
the table.
The child support order shall require:
(a) the custodial parent to pay uninsured routine medical
and dental expenses, including routine office visits,
physical examinations, immunizations, and
(b)
both parents to share all other reasonable and
necessary uninsured medical and dental expenses in a
ratio to be determined by the appropriate court or
administrative agency.
(3) (a) If health insurance is available to both parents at
17

a reasonable cost and the children would gain more complete
coverage by doing so, both parents shall be ordered to
maintain insurance for the dependent children.
(b) If insurance is not available to both parents at a
reasonable cost or if no advantage to the children's coverage
would result, the parent who can obtain the most favorable
coverage shall be ordered to maintain that insurance.
Based on the statutes in effect at the time of the trial, the
Court

was

not

required

to make

any

order

concerning

medical

insurance an expenses as there was already an order in effect at
the time of trial.

Additionally, David Moore specifically and

knowingly entered into a stipulation whereby he agreed to assume
100% of all liability for the payment of the insurance premiums and
the medical expenses not covered by the insurance.

In his Petition

to Modify, he failed to allege a substantial and material change in
circumstances
provision.
authority

which

would

justify

the

modification

of

that

Finally, pursuant to the statute, the Court has the
and discretion

to order only one party

to

maintain

medical insurance for the benefit of the minor children and to
allocate the liability for the payment of medical expenses which
are not covered by insurance.

This is specifically what the Court

did by approving the parties' stipulation, incorporating the terms
into a decree of divorce and in its ruling at the trial in this
matter.

As such, the Court properly held that the Plaintiff is

responsible for the payment of the medical insurance premium and
the uninsured medical expenses incurred for the benefit of the
minor children.
Sandra Moore again respectfully urges this Court to affirm the
ruling of the trial court.
18

Point III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PAYMENTS MADE DIRECTLY TO
THE CHILDREN AND OTHER EXPENSES PAID ON BEHALF OF THE CHILDREN
INCLUDING MEDICAL INSURANCE PREMIUMS AND UNINSURED MEDICAL
EXPENSES WERE NOT CHILD SUPPORT.
Because the trial court correctly ruled that David Moore's
payment of monies directly to the children or for expenses on their
behalf, including medical insurance premiums and uninsured medical
expenses, were not child support, this Court should affirm the
decision of the trial court.
David Moore's argument that all sums paid directly to the
children, for expenses on behalf of the children, medical insurance
premiums and uninsured medical expenses is misplaced.

First, there

is nothing in the Decree which permits such offsets against his
support obligation.
Second, Utah Code is clear as to what may be considered a
permissible

offset

against

child

support.

Section

78-45-7.15

specifically states that medical insurance premiums may be used in
the child support calculation and that uninsured medical could not
be.

However, as noted above, David Moore specifically stipulated

that he would be solely and 100% liable for the medical insurance
premiums and uninsured medical expenses without seeking any kind of
offset against his child support.
Further, David Moore failed to present any evidence before the
Court

as to what the child's portion he paid

insurance premiums.

of the medical

While Mr. Moore discussed his dilemma as to

which part of the Decree to ignore, he failed to in any way state
who was covered under the policy during what periods of time.
19

As

such, there was no evidence before the Court as to the child's
portion of the medical insurance premium for any given time period.
Additionally,

it is equally clear that gifts made to the

children in the form of cash, clothing, or paying their expenses do
not constitute child support to Sandra Moore.

As further evidence

of this fact, David Moore has failed to provide any case law or
statutory citations of the Utah Code which support his untenable
position.

There is no legal support for the proposition that in

kind contributions to children (and perhaps to adult children to
whom David Moore's legal obligation has ceased leaving him only his
moral obligations to wrestle with) in any form constitute child
support or offsets thereto.

This is especially true when the

decision to make such payments is unilaterally made by the obligor,
David Moore.
Thus, this court should affirm the decision of the trial
court.
Point IV
THE TRIAL CORRECTLY DECIDED THAT CHILD SUPPORT SHOULD REMAIN
AT THE AMOUNT SET AT THE TIME OF THE ENTRY OF THE STIPULATION
BETWEEN THE PARTIES UPON WHICH THE DECREE WAS BASED.
The trial court correctly ruled that the child support amount
should remain at the amount specified by the parties at the time of
the entry of the Stipulation and Decree of Divorce.

This Court

should affirm the decision of the trial court.
At the time of the entry of the decree of divorce, David Moore
was

unemployed.

However,

he

anticipated

gaining

immediate

employment which would pay him approximately $2,000.00 in gross
20

revenues per month.

David Moore testified both verbally and in the

form of exhibits that at the time of trial he was again unemployed
(and one can only assume based on the totality of his testimony)
about to procure another job.

In the intervening period of time,

David Moore testified that he earned $20,639.00 in 1987, $21,197 in
1988, $26,883 in 1989, $37,610 in 1990, $35,404 in 1991, $10,710 in
1992 and no income during 1993 while he was seeking a job.
These

income figures show that on average, Mr. Moore was

earning historically approximately the same amount which he was
earning at the time of the entry of the decree of divorce.
such, the trial court refused to modify the child

As

support in

accordance with the request of Mr. Moore.
Further, the issue of the modification of child support was
never properly brought before the trial court.
David

Moore

filed

a Petition

to Modify

As noted above,

Decree.

(R.

92-95).

However, at no place in the Petition to Modify the Decree does
David Moore seek a change in the child support amount other than
reductions in the amount of $200.00 per child when said child
reaches the age of eighteen.

Thus, not only did the trial court

reach the right conclusion, it reached the only possible conclusion
in light of the fact that the issue of a modification of the child
support amount was never brought before the Court by way of either
Petition to Modify or Sandra Moore's order to show cause.
This Court should affirm the ruling of the trial court.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly ruled on each of the issues of this
21

court,
Dated this

^P0

day of

/V/M

.,

1996,

Steven C. Tycksen
Attorney for Defendant
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ADDENDUM

78-45-7.1

JUDICIAL CODE

mother's health, and set the award at $200 per
month per child. Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Modification of support—Divorce decree.
The divorce decree establishes the duty of
support the ex-husband owes to his ex-wife and
a complaint under this section to modify that
duty of support is improper. Mecham v.
Mecham, 570 P.2d 123 (Utah 1977).
State recovery of assistance to child.
State, which was joined as a party to the divorce action before court entered order deter-

mining husband's obligation for child support,
was entitled to reimbursement from the husband for assistance furnished the child before
entry of the order for support in the amount,
based upon the relevant factors as set out in
this section, as set out in the support order.
Roberts v. Roberts, 592 P.2d 597 (Utah 1979).
Cited in Kelly v. Draney, 754 P.2d 92 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988); Johnson v. Johnson, 771 P.2d
696 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Proctor v. Proctor,
773 P.2d 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Moon v.
Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 791 P.2d 895 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note. New Standards
for Child Support Enforcement in Utah, 1986
Utah L. Rev. 591.
From Guesswork to Guidelines—The Adoption of Uniform Child Support Guidelines in
Utah, 1989 Utah L Rev. 859.
Am. J u r . 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband

and Wife § 330 et seq.; 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent
and Child § 54 et seq.
C-J.8. — 41 C J . S . Husband and Wife § 48
et seq.; 67A CJ.S. Parent and Child S 50.
Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife *» 4;
Parent and Child *» 3.1(5).

78-45-7.1. Medical and dental expenses of dependent children — Assigning responsibility for payment —
Insurance coverage.
When no prior court order exists or the prior court order makes no specific
provision for the payment of medical and dental expenses for dependent children, the court in its order:
(1) shall include a provision assigning responsibility for the payment of
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses for the dependent
children; and
(2) may include a provision requiring the purchase and maintenance of
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for those children
if insurance coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.1, enacted by L.
1984, ch. 13, 5 3; 1990, ch. 166, 5 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, added the subsection designations, substituted "is or be-

comes available" for "is available" in Subsection (2), and made stylistic changes.
Cross-References. — Divorce, maintenance
and health care of parties, i 30-3-5.

78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal.
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing or modifying an award of child support entered on or after July 1, 1989.
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or permanent child support.
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations required by the guidelines and the award amounts resulting from
662
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78-45-7.16

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45-7.15. Medical and dental expenses — Insurance.
(1) Only the costs of health and dental insurance premiums for children are
included in the base combined child support obligation table.
(2) Uninsured medical and dental expenses are not included in the table.
The child support order shall require:
(a) the custodial parent to pay uninsured routine medical and dental
expenses, including routine office visits, physical examinations, and immunizations; and
(b) both parents to share all other reasonable and necessary uninsured
medical and dental expenses in a ratio to be determined by the appropriate court or administrative agency.
(3) (a) If health insurance is available to both parents at a reasonable cost
and the children would gain more complete coverage by doing so, both
parents shall be ordered to maintain insurance for the dependent children.
(b) If insurance is not available to both parents at a reasonable cost or
if no advantage to the children's coverage would result, the parent who
can obtain the most favorable coverage shall be ordered to maintain that
insurance.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.15, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 17; 1990, ch. 100, S 11.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, in Subsection
(2Mb), deleted "equally" after "share" and
added the language beginning "in a ratio."

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45-7.16. Child care expenses — Expenses not incurred.
(1) The monthly amount to be paid for reasonable work-related child care
costs actually incurred on behalf of the dependent children of the parents shall
be specified as a separate monthly amount in the order.
(2) If an actual expense included in an amount specified in the order ceases
to be incurred, the obligor may suspend making monthly payment of that
expense while it is not being incurred, without obtaining a modification of the
child support order.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.16, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 18; 1990, ch. 100, § 12.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, in Subsection
(1) deleted "(a) The monthly amount of all
known reasonable and necessary uninsured extraordinary medical expenses and" from the
beginning, deleted "in addition to the base
child support award" after "to be paid," and
substituted "a separate monthly amount" for
"two separate monthly amounts"; redesignated

former Subsection (1Kb) as Subsection (2); and
deleted former Subsection (2), which read "Unless the expenses described in Subsection (1)
are included in the child support order, or the
parents enter into a written agreement to
share the expenses, one parent may not obligate both parents to pay the expenses."
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

